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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
II~\XSOK

and
BETH P. H.ANSOX, his wife,
Plai11 t iIf s-Rrs p011d ents,
-vs.ll()l\ll£R \Y·.

BEEHIVE
et al.,

N~~('1lTI~Irr\T CO~IP ANY,

Defrnd a11 t -Appell aut.

BRIEF

o~F

·~\

(

Case
No. 9682

)

AP·PELLANT

ST.t\_TEl\lENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to determine the validity and effect
of a real estate mortgage entered into between \'Villard
J. Stringer, \Tiola Stringer and Beehive Security
Company.
DISPOSlrriOX IX LOWER COURT
This case is an appeal by the Defendant, BeehiYe
SPrnrity Company, of the judg·ment entered .t\ pril 6,
19(i~, in Civil X o. 13213~ of the District Court of Salt
Lake County by J ndge Joseph G. Jeppson ·w·herein the
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court decided that the mortgage entered into between
Willard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security
Company was cancelled, annulled, rescinded and held
for naught.
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS
On August 1, 1961, the Respondents \vent to the office
of Lothaire Rich, a real estate broker and lawyer, to
make a real estate transaction. This transaction "Tas to
be the exchange of Respondents' nine four-plexes and one
home for a promissory note O\\rned by Bonneville Securities Corporation. According to the Earnest ~foney Receipt and conversation bet,veen the Respondents and
Lothaire Rich, their lawyer ( TR-9), the Grantee in the
conveyances was to be Bonneville Securities Corporation ( R-28).
1\.lso present at lllr. Rich's office \vere Willard J. and
Viola Stringer and Boyd Fullmer, the President of Bonneville Securities Corporation ( TR-5). Sometime prior
to the actual closing of the transaction the question \vas
asked \vhat ~fr. Stringer \vas doing there at that time
(TR-21), and ~Ir. Rich in the presence of the Respondents
said that l\fr. Stringer \Yas getting part of the property
(TR-22).
At the time the deeds "Tere ~ig-ned by the Respondents
they 'vere a\\Tare that the name of the Grantee had not
ben filled in ( R-29), ( TR-7), ( TR -~~2), and they "Tere also
a\vare that part of the propt>rty \\'"as to go to the Stringers (TR-22 also TR-59). Respondents told ~Ir. Rich to
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fill the GranteP blank~ \Vith the name of Bonneville Securities Corporation prior to the delivery of the deeds
(R-29). \Vhe11 questioned as to the reason for the Grantee's namP not being filled in, ~~ rs. Hansen replied: ''Beea use \Ve had a \vhole buneh of big important men there,
and they seemed to kno\v "That they \Vere doing'' ( TR-33).
Her husband, Mr. Hanson, was at this time a licensed
real estate salesman for Riddle, Inc. (TR-3, 4) and the
O\vner of a substantial amount of property.
Sometime after Respondents signed the deeds "Tith
the Grantee left blank, the names of Willard J. and Viola
Stringer were put in as Grantees of the property located
in Davis County, State of Utah, and described as:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 60,
l{IRKHAVEN SUBDIVISION, Plat D, a subdivision of part of the Southwest Quarter of Section
19, To,vnship 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and l\Ieridian; thence North 0°19' West 94.30
feet; thence South 89°53' West 140 feet= thence
South 0°19' East 96.58 feet; thence North 88°57'
East 140 feet to the point of beginning.
(R-29)
On August 2, 1961, Willard J. Stringer received a
loan of $3,000.00 from Appellant, Beehive Security Company, on a promissory note secured by the above property. At this time the deed "'as filled in 'vith "\Villard J.
and Viola Stringer as Grantees, a.nd Beehive Security
Company did not kno,,~ and had no reason to know that
the deed was not valid and complete.
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On August 4, 1961, the deed and mortgage \Yas sent
to the County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake County for
recording ( R-29). The recorder's office 'vould not record
the deed and mortgage because the property \Vas located
in Davis County. On August 7 at 11 :05 a.m. the deed and
mortgage \vere recorded in Davis L ounty. But prior to
this, at 8:30 a.m. on August 7, 1961, a lis pendens \vas
filed on this same property in Davis County.
1

ARGl~~IE~T
PoiNT

I.

"">\ GRANTOR WHO E~XTRl1 STS A DEED,

WITH THE GRANTEE LEFT BI_...:\~1( AFTER
HE HAS SIGNED IT, TO I-IIS ...~GENT WITH
EXPRESS PROVISIOXS ~\ S TO HO\\T THE
GRANTEE'S NAl\IE IS TO BE FILLED IN
C.1\NNOT DECLARE S~\ID DEED VOID IX
REGARD TO A BOXA FIDE PURCHASER
BEC---~USE A DIFFEREXT GR~\XTEE TH~.\X
THE ONE ..:\ UTHORIZED \Y" AS PUT IN THE
DEED.
The present case presents the classic example of t\\To
innocent people suffering because of the \Yrongful act of
a third person. In such cases the n1odern trend of the la\Y
is to protect the person \Vho is not re~ponsible for allo\ving the misdeed to take place, or better said to shift the
loss for the \vrongful act to the person \\'"ho enabled the
third person to canst) the loss. This line of reasoning is
supported by Tiffany Real Property. 3rd Edition, Sec.
969, which sta t<_>s :
''In case a blank as to the name of the grantee
is filled by a person "Tho has no authority for the
4
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purpose, Pither oral or in \vriting, or it is filled in
a manner ront rary to the directions of the grantor,
thP conl·eyanee i~, it is agreed, inYalid as regards
a person \\~ho is a'varc of the circumstances of the
transaction. As regards an innocent grantee or
purchaser, on the other hand, it might frequently
be Ynlid, on the grounds of estoppel, provided he
least pa~Ts Yalue. If the grantor chooses to plac.e
in the hands of another person an instrument duly·
signed and sealed byhim, but \Yhich i~ other,vise
in an incomplete state, and such other exceeds his
authority in making the instrument apparently
complete, the grantor, and not an innocent purchaser, should be the one to suffer on account
thereof. The grantor should be estopped, in such
case, to deny that the instrument is his art and
deed.''
And in the 1960 Supplement to Thompson on Real Proprrfy, Sec. 4232, this is stated more strongly:
''One entrusting an incomplete instrument to
\\Thich he has affixed his signature to another to be
completed and delivered is bound to anyone \vho
relies in good faith on the genuineness of such
instrument, although the person entrusted has exreeded his authority."
This type of reasoning especially applies to the fact
of this case. Here \\Te have sophisticated owners of nine
d\\Telling units. One of the respondents is a registered
real estate salesman (TR-3). They have an attorney acting for them, and they knov,r the deeds \Yere left blank
as to the grantee \vhen they signed them, but they tell
their la"ryer to put the Bonneville Securities Corporation
is as grantee before deli,Tery. The act of putting in this
name \vould haYe taken only a fe\Y minutes. \Vlry, if it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was so important to them, the respondents did not put the
name of the grantee in themselves, if they knew who the
grantee was, we can only speculate about. Perhaps a fe",.
minutes is an inordinate amount o{ time to spend in making a transaction complete after \Vaiting in an attorney's
office an entire afternoon ( TR-4). The point of the matter, however, is that the Respondents could have easily
protected themselves. They kne\v 'vhom they ,,~anted to be
grantees. Their action in entrusting the blank deeds to
their agent after they were signed can only lead to the
conclusion that they should suffer the loss of their o\vn
impatience or negligence. They controlled the transaction. The Appellant did not kno\v the grantee had been
improperly filled in- nor did it have any cause to know
that the instrument at one time was incomplete. The deed
was complete and regular " . hen the loan \vas made, and at
the time it \Vas accepted as security for the loan there had
been no lis pendens or notice given of any irregularity.
Thus far in Utah the particular facts of this case
have not been adjudicated. In Burnanz. et al L·s. Eschler,
116 U. 61, 208 P. 2d 96 (1959) the question before the
court involved the technical question of re-execution and
re-acknowledgment if the grantee name "'"as filled in after
the first signing of the deed by the grantor. Jn this case,
the court referred to Beatty Y. Shelly, 42 U. 592, 132 P.
1160, 1913 and also to Utah ~'-Jltate Bldg. & Loan v. Perkins,
53 U. 47 4, 173 P. 950, 1918 for authority to the proposition
that:

" ... if the name of a grantee is inserted by a
party \Vho never legally obtained possession of the
6
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instrument nor ohtained authority from the grantor to complete the instrument no deed comes into
existcnee. ''
In the Bea.tty case the party relying on the blank deed
'vrongfully o ht ained possession of it and placed his o,\·n
name on it as grantee. He ncYer '\?as a bona fide pnrehaser. The present case is entirely different in that the
.-\ppellant \Vas a bona fide purchaser, and the deed 'Yas
never \Vrongfully taken from the possession of the Respondents. They gaYe it to Rich in order to consummate
the transaetiou. In the Perkins case the person relying
on the blank deeds was not a bona fide purchaser, but
the very person who filled the deeds in. Also, the deed
was illegally taken from the grantor. In the present
ease both of these things are different. The Appellant is
a bona fide purchaser, the deed 'vas rightfully put into
its possession.
Also in the Bea.tty case there is a general statement
"rhich states :
'' .L~dmi ttedly a paper purporting to be a deed,
but ,\~hich is blank as to grantee, is no deed and is
ineffective as a conveyance 'vhile the blank remains. See cases collected at 32 ALR 737 and 173
. .\LR 1294.''

In the present case the deed 'Yas not blank at the
time it "\Vas given to a bona fide purchaser, so that the
general statement cited aboYe docs not apply. Ho"·eyer,
in pursuing the g-eneral references in 32 ALR 7~17, the case
of Guthrie v. Field, 85 Kan. 58, 116 P. 217, 37 LRA (:X.S.)

7
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326, 1911 is cited by the annotator, and the case gives an
excellent discussion of the better law in regard to a bona
fide purchaser of a deed left blank as to the grantee:
''Guthrie on the other hand, by intrusting Field
\vith the blank deed, gave him the power to make
a perfect record title in any one he might choose.
Guthrie intended that Field should fill in and deliver the deed, but only upon certain conditions.
Guthrie reposed confidence in Field that he "\\rould
act in accordance with his instructions, kno"\\Ting
that, if he did not, some innocent person might be
misled. Field delivered the deed contrary to his
instructions, and the consequence follo,ved that
might have been anticipated if he 'vere to proYe
unfaithful - a stranger to the transaction parted
"\Yith his money having every reason to suppose
he "\Yas obtaining a good title. Under these circumstances, the loss must fall upon Guthrie rather
than upon Riffie ...
'' ... One "\Yho arms another "rith such uncontrollable po,ver must kno"\\r that, if his chosen agent
shall prove dishonest, that is likely to happen
"\vhich in fact happened here, and if such result
follows, it must be regarded as the consequence
of his own imprudence. In acknowledging a blank
conveyance before an offieer, a grantor in effect
declares it to be a deed, "\Yhich it is not, so long as
its terms are incomplete. Having purposely put
forth his solemn declaration that he has signed
the instrumPnt as a complete deed, "~hen he has
not in fart done so (expecting the ru~todian to find
a purchaser, fill in the blank, and effect a transfer
of title), he is ans"\Yerable for thP consequences if
another innocently suffers loss throug-h relying
upon such assurance, and he rannot avail himself
of the plea that n blank deed is no deed.''
8
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.-\lso in 175 AI.Jl~ 1300 there are a series of cases
\Vhere the courts have held that the grantor cannot complain after signing a deed in blank and then givi11g it to
an agrnt to later fill in the blanks if the act \\·as improperly done and the holder is no\v a bona fide purchaser. ThP
court in Er!Jnonsou v. ll' aterstou, 342 .:\Io. 1082, 119 S\V2d
318, 1938, states the reasoning excellently:
''If plaintiff ( \vife) \Ycre permitted to have the
deed set aside in this case, many titles to real estate would be in a. precarious condition. No examiner of an abstract \vould be safe in informing his
r lient that he had good ti tie. The \\·idow of a
grantor of the title could come into court and say:
I signed the deed in blank; my husband asked me to
do so because he "\Vas selling the property, but I
never acknowledged the deed; the property "\vas
sold to the \vrong party, and my husband sold it
for more than the consideration mentioned in the
deed. Such a rule would play havoc w·ith realestate titles. Under the authorities and established
I a \V this cannot be done.''
It is true in these cases that the opportunity for
trouble is enhanced because the grantor complaining is
the \\·ife of the agent who exceeded his authority in filling
in the blanks. But the reasoning is equally applicable to
parties other than husband and \vife - and the possible
damage to titles is just as great.
The possible mischief that could be 'vrought to the
titles \vi thin the State of Utah if the Respondents' contention is adopted is enormous, and should not be allo,ved
to happen.
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PoiNT

II.

THE AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT TO EXEECUTE A CONTRACT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS FOR HIS PRINCIPAij
NEED NOT BE IN WRITING.
The problem of the agent's authority being in "\vriting
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds has been considered in
the case of Guthrie v. Field, supra, and decided that:
'' ... the better rule is that authority may be given
by parol to insert the name of a grantee in a deed,
even after delivery.''
But there appears to be divided authority on this problem. In California., the cases of Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal.
85, 1871, and Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 32 P. 2d 968,
1934 hold that the authority of the agent must be in writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. In l:tah,
ho,vever, the Supreme Court has held that absent a statute requiring that the agent's authority be in "\\'Titing a
contract under the Statute of Frauds signed by an agent
'vill not be void. See LeVine, et al. v. Whitelz ouse, et al.,
37 {;. 260, 109 Pac. 2, 1910. Section 25-5-9, lTCA 1!13:1.
gives an agent authorit:T to sign for his principal to satisfy the statute of frauds. No mention is made in the
statute that his authority need be in "rriting. There appears to be no other reference to the need for the agent ·s
authority to be in "~riting, so that the Lc T7.ine case still
Pxpresses Utah la"'" on this subject.

10
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CONCI_.~USION

In conclusion, Appellant respectfully submits that the
mortgage on the contested property be held valid, and
that the judgment of the lo\Yer eourt be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
DEAN E. CoNnER
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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